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This study examines the association between corporate transparency, ethical orientation of 
Fortune 500 companies, the number of females represented on the board of directors as reported 
in the 2010 annual report data and respective stock performance. Our basis for this judgment was 
whether the firm was listed on either (both) Ethisphere Magazine’s 2010 ‘World’s Most Ethical 
Companies’ or (and) Corporate Responsibility Magazine’s 2010 ‘100 Best Corporate Citizens 
List’. Our results indicate that, as the number of women directors increased, the probability of a 
corporation appearing on these lists increases. Finally, while being on one of these lists did not 
increase corporate return data in a statistically significant sense, it did dramatically reduce the 
degree of negative returns.  
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Bernardi and several coauthors (2002 to 2010) examined various issues associated with female 
board members. Bernardi et al. (2002, 2005) found that corporations were more likely to include 
pictures of the board in their annual reports when the membership of their board included women 
(2002) and/or minorities (2005). Bernardi et al. also found that corporations with higher 
percentages of women on their boards were more likely to be on ‘100 best companies to work 
for’ (2006) and ‘most ethical companies’ (2009) lists; have a higher percentage of female 
executives (2004); and, engage in activities demonstrating corporate social responsibility (2010). 
However, the ‘so what’ question remains concerning the increase in female representation on 
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corporate boards and corporate reputation, which equates to the public’s overall perception of a 
corporation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). 
While the number of women on corporate boards has increased by approximately 28 
women per year between 1977 and 2001 (Bernardi et al., 2006), it is still relatively low at 832 
female directors of 5,613 directors on Fortune 500 boards (Bernardi et al, 2009). Stakeholders 
with legitimate interests (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) have lost billions of dollars due to recent 
corporate scandals. Following the corporate scandals in 2002 and new regulatory actions, it is 
surprising to find that the percent of women on boards has not increased substantially. While 
women directors made up 11.9 percent of Fortune 500 boards in 2002, they now make up 14.4 
percent (Bernardi et al., 2009). The 2.5 percent increase represents an additional 156 female 
directors of approximately 5,600 directors (Bernardi et al, 2002 and 2009).
1
 Gender diversity on 
corporate boards associates with financial performance (Carter et al., 2008), reduction in the 
inherent risk (Ittonen et al., 2007), positive market reactions (Defond et al., 2005), and positive 
cumulative abnormal returns (Huang et al., 2011). 
The need for organizations to become better corporate citizens and improve their levels of 
corporate social responsibility has become increasingly evident. Our sample includes the 2010 
Fortune 500 corporations of which 92 (408) corporations appear (do not appear) on Corporate 
Responsibility Magazine’s (hereafter CRM) ‘100 Best Corporate Citizens List’. Our sample also 
includes the 46 (454) corporations that appear (do not appear) on Ethisphere Magazine’s 
(hereafter EM) 2010 ‘World’s Most Ethical Companies’ list.  
Our research indicates that stakeholder advocate organizations (i.e., CRM and EM) tend to 
recognize corporations that have higher proportions of women on their boards. The interaction of 
this recognition and multiple female board members for the corporations in this sample 
associated with higher overall returns and lower negative returns for stockholders’ wealth as 
measured by the market prices of the corporations’ common stock. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Of the 5,514 directors on Fortune 500 boards included in this research, there are 863 female directors (15.1 
percent). 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1 Board Duties 
An organization’s board of directors is responsible for ensuring that a corporation is meeting the 
objectives of stakeholders as well as developing business strategies to prosper in the future 
(Arfken et al., 2004; Peterson and Philpot, 2007). When the corporation fails to meet these 
objectives, many question the ability of the board members. Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) 
indicate that the effectiveness of a board depends heavily on each board member’s qualifications 
and experience. Historically, older white males dominated; consequently, as corporate scandals 
continue, stakeholders push for changes in the corporate structure (McDaniel et al, 2001; Farrell 
and Hersch, 2005). Recent scandals indicate that corporations are not meeting these objectives; 
this suggests that the current homogenous boardroom is unable to perform its duties (Campbell 
and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Burke, 1997; Arfken et al., 2004). Companies now face an investing 
public that demands scrutiny of all corporate decisions and expects board members to be 
accountable for their actions (Arfken et al. 2004).  
Consumers and shareholders question the ability of a homogenous boardroom (Arfken et 
al., 2004); consequently, there has been a call for a higher representation of women on corporate 
boards (Burke, 1997). Many feel that the presence of women on corporate boards adds a sense of 
moral obligation to a corporation’s decision-making process (Arfken et al., 2004) which can in 
turn improve boardroom transparency and limit the likelihood of corporate scandal. The under-
representation of women on boards became public in 1977 (Special Report, 1977); research 
continues to depict this trend (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002). Boards should not overlook their 
female board members and should take initiatives to ensure the consideration of female board 
members’ viewpoints. Burke (1997) indicates that the benefits to both internal and external 
stakeholders of considering female board members’ viewpoints include a more comprehensive 
decision making-process that is both creative and innovative. Women are able to bring a new 
perspective to the homogenous boardroom including raising issues that affect a wider range of 





2.2 Board Diversity 
Research has shown that lack of diversity within a boardroom results in a manila mindset 
to solving corporate problems (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002) that can lead to group think issues 
as well as lack of achievement within the company. Over the past decade, homogenous boards 
have been a contributing factor to spectacular failures and overall poor governance (Brown et al., 
2002). A more diverse board results in an increased representation of moral and ethical 
viewpoints in the discussions prior to making decisions (Arfken et al., 2004). Diversity limits the 
possibility of a myopic decision-making process that can result in “unhealthy and possibly 
unethical decisions” (Arfken et al., 2004 p. 185) when the board has similar demographics. 
Many studies have cited that diversity not only limits the likelihood of myopic decision-making 
process but also increases the likelihood of positive occurrences such as fresh ideas, better 
problem solving, improved strategic planning, and additional accountability (Arfken et al., 
2004). Diversity in the boardroom allows members to make better decisions as a more complete 
picture of the issues at hand are typically discussed (Adams and Flynn, 2005). Adams and 
Ferreira’s (2009) research indicates that diverse boards are more likely to hold CEOs responsible 
for poor stock price performance and that board compensation is typically equity-based, 
implying that the board is more aligned with shareholder interests. These findings further the 
idea that having women on boards can add value to a company. 
Overall, gender-diverse boards have increased levels of boardroom involvement and 
corporate oversight (Adams and Ferreira, 2009); boards with a greater female presence have 
higher levels of meeting attendance. The primary way in which boards operate and conduct 
business is through meetings and thus, attendance is a crucial factor of a successful board 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009). These authors note that women were less likely to have attendance 
problems and that having females on boards results in better attendance by male directors. 
Clearly, the female influence in this area is quite important; increasing attendance should result 
in better boardroom discussion and higher levels of effectiveness.  
An increased membership of female directors positively associated enhanced corporate 
reputation (Bear et al., 2010). Bernardi et al. also found that corporations with higher 
percentages of women on their boards were more likely to be named as one of the ‘100 best 
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companies to work for’ (2006), one of the ‘most ethical companies’ (2009), and a higher number 
of female executive-level managers (2004). 
2.3 Ethical Orientation 
The individuals an organization attracts, hires, and retains influence the organization’s 
ethical climate (Schneider, 1987). Harrison (1992) indicates that factors essential to economic 
success include a sense of community (i.e. a trusting and caring environment - Reynolds, 2003) 
and a robust ethical system. Employees are more likely to support a corporation’s values when 
the corporation demonstrates a commitment to the welfare of its community (Barnett and 
Schubert, 2002). Young people are attracted to a company’s social record (Goodpaster, 1991); 
for example, Bernardi and Guptill (2008) found that women from eight countries who were 
approaching graduation were more concerned about a corporation’s reputation within its 
community than were their male counterparts. Consequently, as Arnold et al. (1997) suggest, the 
foundation of an ethical organization culminates in an environment that nurtures ethical 
behavior.  
Bernardi and Arnold (1997) and Akaah (1989) indicate a difference between males’ and 
females’ moral reasoning and development implying that the way men and women handle ethical 
decision-making differs. Williams (2003) makes clear the correlation between increased levels of 
female directors and a company’s involvement in corporate social responsibility activities. The 
more concerned the firm is with issues of corporate responsibility, the less likely the firm will 
take actions that are considered unethical or do not promote the overall wellbeing of the firm and 
the surrounding environment. In a corporate landscape where corruption is rampant, it is 
essential that corporations work to ensure their culture is ethical and women are able to enhance 
this important aspect (McDaniel et al., 2001). Bernardi et al. found that corporations with higher 
percentages of women on their boards were more likely to be on EM’s ‘most ethical companies’ 
list (2009) and engage in activities demonstrating corporate social responsibility (2010). 
2.4 Transparency 
While ethical orientation is concerned with the internal decisions that an organization 
makes, transparency focuses on whether stakeholders have access to this information. An 
organization’s reputation rests on its stakeholders trust (Larkin, 2003), which directly relates to 
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the information that is available about the organization (i.e., the transparency of the company). 
Public disclosure of information has increased in an effort to increase trust in organizations 
because trust at all levels is essential to a corporation’s legitimacy (The Economist, 2000). 
Following instances such as Enron, the Big-Four firms have all indicated a commitment to ethics 
and transparent reporting (Lehman, 1992). Deloitte and Touche initiated a challenge to restore 
the profession’s public trust (Parrett, 2004) and both KPMG (2003) and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2003) call for increased transparency and integrity in corporate reporting. 
Organizations that are not forthcoming with information tend to be hiding essential facts 
from stakeholders; this process leads to the possibility of corporate scandal. The lack of 
transparency and audit failure contributed to the Enron debacle - one of the most discussed 
financial scandals. Reinstein and McMillan (2004) show that Enron’s collapse was not a perfect 
storm (i.e., a happenstance of rare events that had devastating effects). Rather, the audit team 
from Andersen ignored or missed red flags that would have indicated problems with Enron’s 
financial heath (Reinstein and McMillan, 2004). In this case, understanding the organization’s 
operations would have lead stakeholders to question Enron’s profits and financial statements.  
2.5 Women and Economic Performance 
Businesses operate with the objective to earn a profit and in turn increase shareholder 
value. Corporate managers, and those who are interested in positive governance, believe that 
there is a correlation between board diversity and shareholder value (Carter et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, investors are willing to pay more for firms with effective corporate governance 
(Smalhout, 2003). Jackson (2004) found that most individuals consider reputation in their 
investment decisions; research also suggests that stock performance associates with corporate 
reputation (Miles and Covin, 2000; Vergin and Qoronfleh, 1998; Sparks, 1998; Sims, 1994).  
Many corporations recognize that increasing shareholder value should occur in an ethical 
manner, but the implementation of this process can be difficult. Corporations are under 
increasing pressure to act in a socially responsible manner while still attaining high profit levels. 
Corporate social responsibility is the implementation of policies that recognize the relationship 
among business ethics, community investment, governance and many other aspects of business 
(Tsoutsoura, 2004; Bernardi et al., 2006).  
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Prior research demonstrated the benefits that having women on boards can bring to an 
organization, but many question the ability of organizations to be socially responsible while still 
meeting shareholder expectations. Some feel that social responsibility results in increased cost 
pressures on organizations, which can affect the bottom line. However, corporations that engage 
in socially responsible practices can more easily obtain capital as their reputation of being less 
risky (Tsoursoura, 2004). Together, these aspects help improve the public’s view of the firm thus 
increasing profitability. Tsoursoura also found that financial performance and corporate social 
responsibility were positively associated. Most importantly, Tsoursoura found that the industries 
with the lowest ratings for social responsibility include mining and construction, the same sectors 
with the lowest number of women on boards (GovernanceMetrics International, 2010). These 
findings show that having women on boards does in fact positively affect the social 
responsibility behaviors of an organization. Bear et al. (2010) found that the number of female 
directors positively associated with measures of corporate reputation. Bernardi et al. (2006) also 
found that an increased proportion of female representation on boards associated with the 
corporation’s inclusion on the ‘100 Best Companies to Work For’ list.  
Additionally, corporations that value diversity have proven to be more competitive in the 
overall business setting (McDaniel et al, 2001). Farrell and Hersch (2005) conducted research on 
the effect that women board members have on a corporation’s common stock performance. They 
found that, while adding women to the board positively associated with return on assets, the 
market failed to react to adding women to a board. This information supports the idea that having 
women on boards has a direct impact on the bottom-line profits of an organization, but at this 
point fails to influence investor opinion.  
2.6  Hypothesis Development  
While overconfidence in decision-making occurs in both men and women, men are 
typically more overconfident than women are especially in areas considered masculine (i.e., 
financial decisions) (Lundeberg et al., 1994). Barber and Odean (2000) found that men tended to 
turn over their portfolios more often and have lower returns than women; they suggest that 
overconfidence leads to high levels of counterproductive trading. Huang and Kisgen (2008) 
found that female CFO’s tended to be more risk adverse, used debt less frequently to finance 
corporate capital demands, made fewer acquisitions, and outperformed corporations with male 
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CFOs. Consequently, women can also bring different viewpoints/attitudes to an organization 
through board membership.  
Carter et al. (2003) indicate that gender diversity enhances understanding of the intricacies 
of a corporation’s market. Women are able to bring their insights to the boardroom and match 
the diversity of the organization’s consumer base. In general, boards that closely match the 
makeup of the general population provide improved corporate social performance (Bernardi et 
al., 2006). Diversity also allows an organization to view problems in a different manner and 
reevaluate the way in which they do business. Prior research shows that improved performance 
associates with boards that are diverse with respect to gender (Brady, 2007; Cohen and Kornfeld, 
2006).  
Adding female board members has proven to increase an organization’s sense of 
responsibility. Carter et al. (2008) noted that the effect of gender diversity on a board’s audit 
function associated with financial performance. Ittonen et al. (2007) found that, when female 
board members are on the board’s audit committee, there was a reduction in the inherent risk of 
financial misstatements. These authors also noted that gender diversity associates with lower 
audit fees. Audit committees that include women tend to be more conservative; Thiruvadi and 
Huang (2011) report that, when female directors were members of audit committees, 
corporations tended to report increased negative accruals, which decrease income. When new 
audit committee members had accounting expertise, the market reacted positively (Defond et al., 
2005). Huang et al. (2011) found that, when compared to the addition of male board members, 
the addition of female board members to the audit committee resulted in positive cumulative 
abnormal returns.
 2
 Gender diversity can be beneficial in situations involving complex tasks, 
which require creative decision-making (Kravitz, 2003). Consequently, expanding a board’s 
viewpoint can facilitate increased discussion, better problem solving tactics, and a better 
understanding of the marketplace as a whole. 
Gul et al. (2011) found that board-gender diversity encouraged corporations to increase 
their disclosure of corporate data. Bernardi et al. found that corporations with higher percentages 
                                                          
2
 While Nguyen and Faff (2006) found that gender diversity associated with higher firm values, Wang and Clift 
(2009) found that gender and racial diversity did not influence firm performance – both studies used listed 
Australian corporations. 
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of women on their boards were more likely to be on ‘100 best companies to work for’ (2006) and 
‘most ethical companies’ (2009) lists. However, this research fails to associate female directors 
and listings with financial performance, which leads to our research hypotheses (stated in their 
alternate form):  
H1: The corporations on CRM’s (2010) list will have a higher (lower) proportion of multiple 
female directors (zero or only one director) than for corporations not on this list. 
H2: The corporations on EM’s (2010) list will have a higher (lower) proportion of multiple 
female directors (zero or only one director) than for corporations not on this list.  
H3: Membership on CRM’s (2010) list will associate with higher (lower) increases (decreases) in 
common stock prices in 2010.  
H4: Membership on EM’s (2010) list will associate with higher (lower) increases (decreases) in 
common stock prices in 2010.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Sample 
The current sample includes the 2010 Fortune 500 corporations of which 92 (408) corporations 
appear (do not appear) on CRM’s list (Table 1). The sample also includes the 46 (454) 
corporations that appear (do not appear) on EM’s 2010 list (Table 2). Appendix A provides the 
methodology for CRM’s list. Appendix B provides the methodology for EM’s list. We 
determined the size and gender composition of the corporate boards of directors by referring to 
the companies’ actual 2010 annual reports or from data included in the Mergent Online database. 
3.2 Selection Processes and Corporate Return Data 
 CRM’s list (Appendix A) took into consideration both the transparency and the level of 
social responsibility of an organization. It is important to note that our basis for considering an 
organization as transparent lies with the fact that the magazine penalized corporations for not 
disclosing information relating to social responsibility. EM’s list (Appendix B) acknowledges 
corporations for being ethical and following compliance measures through positive leadership.  
We tested the research question relating to the organization’s financial return using a rate 
of return for the period between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2010. We used historic stock 
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prices to determine the price per share of each organization at the earliest available stock price in 
2010 in relation to the latest available stock price in 2010 at the close of the trading day. In order 
to determine the percentage change of the stock price for the given year, we subtracted the 
beginning (January 1) stock price from the ending (December 31) stock price, which we divided 
by the beginning stock price. 
Table 1: Most Transparent Companies 
 
     
3M  Ford Motor  Northeast Utilities 
Abbott Laboratories  FPL Group  Occidental Petroleum 
Advanced Micro Devices  Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold  Oracle 
Air Products & Chemical  Gap  Owens Corning 
Alcoa  General Mills  Pepsi Bottling 
Allergan  H.J. Heinz  PepsiCo 
Applied Materials  Hess  PG&E Corp. 
Avon Products  Hewlett-Packard  Procter & Gamble 
Ball  Hormel Foods  Quest Diagnostics 
Baxter International  Intel  Raytheon 
Boeing  International Business Machines  Sara Lee 
Bristol-Myers Squibb  International Paper  Sempra Energy 
Campbell Soup  ITT  Sherwin-Williams 
Chevron  J.C. Penney  Southern 
Cisco Systems  J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.  Staples 
Citigroup  Johnson & Johnson  Starbucks 
Coca-Cola  Johnson Controls  State Street Corp. 
Coca-Cola Enterprises  Kellogg  Stryker 
Colgate-Palmolive  Kimberly-Clark  Texas Instruments 
ConAgra Foods  Lubrizol  TJX 
Consolidated Edison  Mattel  Union Pacific 
Cummins  McDonald's  United Parcel Service 
CVS Caremark  McGraw-Hill  Verizon 
Deere  McKesson  Wal-Mart Stores 
Dell  Medtronic  Walt Disney 
Dominion Resources  Merck  Weyerhaeuser 
Duke Energy  Microsoft  Wisconsin Energy 
Eaton  Monsanto  Xcel Energy 
EMC  Mosaic  Xerox 
Exelon  Newmont Mining  Yum Brands 
Exxon Mobil  Nike   
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3.3 Board Gender Data 
While our initial analysis included all Fortune 500 corporations, 51 of these corporations 
are not publicly listed; of the 51 corporations that were not publicly traded, three of them were 
on CRM’s list. For the 89 publicly traded corporations that appear on CRM’s list, there were 195 
female directors and 1057 total directors (18.4 percent). The 89 corporations on CRM’s list make 
up 19.8 percent of the 449 publicly traded companies in the Fortune 500. Our data indicate that 
of the 89 corporations on CRM’s list: 1.1 percent had no female directors; 21.3 percent had one 
female director; and, 77.5 percent had multiple female directors. We compared these percentages 
to those for the remaining 406 corporations that have 586 female directors and 3,904 total 
directors (15.0 percent). The data for these corporations indicate that: 14.4 percent had no female 
directors; 32.2 percent had one female director; and, 55.3 percent had multiple female directors. 
Table 2: Most Ethical Companies 
 
     
Aflac  Flour  Pitney Bowes 
American Express  Ford Motor  Principal Financial 
Aramark  FPL Group  Rockwell Automation 
Ashland  Gap  Rockwell Collins 
Becton Dickinson  General Electric  Sempra Energy 
Best Buy  General Mills  Starbucks 
Campbell Soup  Google  Symantec 
Caterpillar  Harris  Target 
CH2M Hill  Hartford Financial Services  Texas Instruments 
Cisco Systems  Hewlett-Packard  Time Warner 
Cummins  International Paper  United Parcel Service 
Deere  Johnson Controls  Waste Management 
Duke Energy  Mattel  Weyerhaeuser 
Eaton  Nike  Whole Foods Market 
Ecolab  PepsiCo  Wisconsin Energy 
    Xerox 
     
 
 Three of the 46 corporations that appear on EM’s list are not publicly traded. For the 43 
publicly traded corporations that appear on EM’s list, there are 93 female directors and 491 total 
directors (18.9 percent). Our data indicate that of those: 2.3 percent had no female directors; 23.3 
percent had one female director; and, 74.4 percent had multiple female directors. We compared 
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these percentages to those for the remaining 406 corporations that have 688 female directors and 
4,470 total directors (15.4 percent). The data for these corporations indicate that: 12.8 percent 
had no female directors; 30.8 percent had one female director; and, 56.4 percent had multiple 
female directors. 
 
4. Analyses and Findings 
4.1 Overview 
For this part of the analysis, we used the data from 449 of the Fortune 500 companies that had 
publicly listed performance data - the other 51 companies were not publicly listed. In our 
analysis, we group corporations by whether or not they appear on a specific list and by the 
number of female board members: no female board members, one female board member, and 
multiple female board members. In our examination of the data, we use contingency analysis, as 
we believe it visually demonstrates our findings with respect to listing by either CRM or EM, 
board gender diversity and common stock performance. 
4.2 Corporate Reputation and Female Board Members (H1 and H2) 
 This part of the analysis tests for an association between listing by either CRM or EM and 
gender. For the 89 corporations included on CRM’s list, there was one corporation (1.1 percent) 
with no female directors, 19 corporations (21.4 percent) with one female director and 69 
corporations (77.5 percent) with multiple female directors. For the 360 corporations that were 
not included on CRM’s list, there were 52 corporations (14.5 percent) with no female directors, 
126 corporations (32.2 percent) with one female director and 192 corporations (53.3 percent) 
with multiple female directors. While the corporations not listed by CRM had a higher proportion 
of corporations with no female directors or only one female director (14.5 and 32.2 percent 
respectively) than the corporations listed by CRM (1.1 and 21.4 percent respectively), the reverse 
is true for corporations with multiple female directors (53.3 versus 77.5 percent respectively). 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the actual and expected number of female directors for each of group 





 Our analysis indicates that all treatments are not proportionally represented  
(χ
2
 statistic = 20.72, p < 0.000). The most significant contributors to this difference were the 
corporations listed by CRM. Corporations on CRM’s list had higher proportion of corporations 
with multiple female directors, which supports our first research hypothesis.  
 For the 43 corporations included on EM’s list, there was one corporation (2.3 percent) with 
no female directors, 10 corporations (23.3 percent) with one female director and 32 corporations 
(74.4 percent) with multiple female directors. For the 406 corporations that were not included on 
EM’s list, there were 52 corporations (12.8 percent) with no female directors, 125 corporations 
(30.8 percent) with one female director and 229 corporations (56.4 percent) with multiple female 
directors. While the corporations not listed by EM had a higher proportion of corporations with 
no female directors or only one female director (12.8 and 30.8 percent respectively) than the 
corporations listed by EM (2.3 and 23.3 percent respectively), the reverse is true for corporations 
with multiple female directors (56.4 versus 74.4 percent respectively). 
 Panel B of Table 3 shows the actual and expected number of female directors for each of 




 statistic = 6.52, p = 0.045). The most significant contributors to this difference were the 
corporations listed by EM. Corporations on EM’s list had higher proportion of corporations with 
multiple female directors, which supports our second research hypothesis. 
4.3     Corporate Reputation and Performance (H3 and H4) 
 This part of the analysis tests for an association among listing by either CRM or EM and 
corporate performance. On an overall basis, the data indicate that the 89 (360) corporations (not) 
included on CRM’s list had an increase of 11.9 (6.7) percent - average return of 7.7 percent. The 
43 (406) corporations (not) included on EM’s list had an increase of 16.2 (6.8) percent  
                                                          
3
 In our contingency analysis, we computed the expected number of companies for each group by multiplying the 
total number of corporations in each column (i.e., the number of female directors on the board) by proportion of the 
sample (i.e., either the number of transparent or remaining companies divided by the total sample). For example, for 
the 16 transparent companies that have one female director, we would expect to have 26.8 companies ([19+116] X 
[89/449]) rather than our actual count of 19 companies. Similarly, for the remaining companies with one female 






TABLE 3: LISTING BY CRM OR EM AND BOARD GENDER COMPOSITION 
      
Panel A: CRM’S listing 
  Number of Female Directors  
  None One Multiple Total 
   Transparent corporations Actual 1 19 69 89 
 Expected 10.5 26.8 51.7 89 
 χ2 stat 8.60 2.25 5.76 16.61 
      
   Remaining corporations Actual 52 116 192 360 
 Expected 42.5 108.2 209.3 360 
 χ2 stat 2.13 0.56 1.43 4.11 
      
Panel B: EM’S listing 
  Number of Female Directors  
  None One Multiple Total 
   Ethical corporations Actual 1 10 32 43 
 Expected 5.1 12.9 25.0 43 
 χ2 stat 3.27 0.66 1.96 5.90 
      
   Remaining corporations Actual 52 125 229 406 
 Expected 47.9 122.1 236.0 406 
 χ2 stat 0.35 0.07 0.21 0.63 
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- average return of 7.7 percent. Consequently, on an overall basis, our first two hypotheses about 
being on a listed by either CRM or EM and higher common stock prices were supported by the 
data. Panel A of Table 4 provides the average returns for the six groups of companies. Our 
analysis indicates that all treatments did not have a 7.7 percent increase in common stock value 
(χ
2
 statistic = 8.06, p = 0.02).
 4 
 The most significant contributors to this difference were the 
corporations listed by CRM with one female director and multiple female directors. It is the 
higher percent of increase for corporations listed by CRM that are driving the difference in 
treatments. We further divided the data in Panel A by whether their common stock price 
increased (Panel B) or decreased (Panel C) for additional analysis. 
 For the corporations in Panel B, the average increase in their stock price was 19.9 percent. 
The data in Panel B indicate no difference in treatments (χ
2
 statistic = 1.23, not significant) for 
the corporations whose common stock prices increased. For the corporations in Panel C, the 
average decrease in their stock price was 38.0 percent. The data in Panel C indicate that not all 
treatments had a 38.0 percent decrease in common stock value (χ
2
 statistic = 54.91,  
p < 0.000). Again, our data indicates that the most significant contributors to this difference were 
the corporations listed by CRM with one female director and multiple female directors. The 
common stock prices for the 19 corporations listed by CRM (average = -9.1 percent) did not 
decrease as much as the 76 corporations that were not listed (average = -45.2 percent). 
Consequently, the data support our third hypothesis. 
 Panel A of Table 5 provides the average returns for the six groups of companies. Our 
analysis indicates that not all treatments had a 7.7 percent increase in common stock value  
(χ
2
 statistic = 20.62, p < 0.000). The most significant contributors to this difference were the 
corporations listed by EM with one female director and multiple female directors. It is the higher 
percent of increase for corporations listed by EM that are driving the difference in treatments. 
We further divided the data in Panel A by whether their common stock price increased (Panel B) 
or decreased (Panel C) for additional analysis. 
                                                          
4
 We did not include the data for the first group (i.e., being listed by either CRM or EM and no female directors) as 
there was only one firm in this group (i.e., return of 31.5 percent was not an average).  
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TABLE 4: AVERAGE PERCENT CHANGE IN SHARE PRICE AND CRM’S LISTINGS 
      
Panel A: Average Percent Change for all Corporations (average = 7.7 percent) 
  Number of Female Directors  
  None One Multiple Total 
   Transparent corporations (%) 31.3 13.9 10.8 11.9 
 (n)    (1)  (19)  (69)  (89) 
 χ2 stat NA 5.04 1.27 6.31 
      
   Remaining corporations (%) 10.5 5.8 6.3 6.7 
 (n) (52) (116) (192) (360) 
 χ2 stat 1.04 0.46 0.25 1.71 
      
Panel B: Average Percent Change for Corporations with Positive Returns (average = 19.9 percent) 
  Number of Female Directors  
  None One Multiple Total 
   Transparent corporations (%) 31.3 17.8 16.9 17.3 
 (n)    (1)  (16)  (53)  (70) 
 χ2 stat NA 0.22 0.46 0.68 
      
   Remaining corporations (%) 23.2 20.3 20.0 20.6 
 (n)  (43)  (92) (149) (284) 
 χ2 stat 0.54 0.01 0.00 0.55 
      
Panel C: Average Percent Change for Corporations with Negative Returns (average = -38.0 percent) 
  Number of Female Directors  
  None One Multiple Total 
   Transparent corporations (%) NA   -6.9   -9.5   -9.1 
 (n) (0)    (3)   (16)   (19) 
 χ2 stat NA 25.47 21.39 46.86 
      
   Remaining corporations (%) -50.4 -49.8 -41.5 -45.2 
 (n)    (9)   (24)   (43)   (76) 
 χ2 stat 4.05 3.67 0.33 8.05    
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 For the corporations in Panel B, the average increase in their stock price was 19.9 percent. 
The data in Panel B indicate no difference in treatments (χ
2
 statistic = 0.90, not significant) for 
the corporations whose common stock prices increased. For the corporations in Panel C, the 
average decrease in their stock price was 38.0 percent. The data in Panel C indicate that not all 
treatments had a 38.0 percent decrease in common stock value (χ
2
 statistic = 50.93,  
p < 0.000). Again, the most significant contributors to this difference were the corporations listed 
by CRM with one female director and multiple female directors. The common stock prices for 
the six corporations listed by EM (average = -10.1 percent) did not decrease as much as the 89 
corporations that were not listed (average = -39.8 percent). Consequently, the data support our 
third hypothesis. 
 This section of our analysis found that corporations on both CRM and EM’s lists had 
higher average increases in their common stock prices (Panel A of Tables 4 and 5). When we 
separated the companies according to whether they had increasing or decreasing stock prices, 
there were no significant differences in the two groups with increasing stock prices (Panel B of 
Tables 4 and 5).  
         However, we found that the decrease in common stock prices for corporations on both 
CRM and EM’s lists was not as large as the decrease for corporations not on these lists (Panel C 
of ables 4 and 5). Consequently, our data indicate an association between a corporation’s 
reputation (i.e., being on either CRM or EM’s list) and common stock performance. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The major contribution of this paper is that board gender diversity can provide an incremental 
benefit for corporations that already have a good reputation in ethical behavior, social 
responsibility and transparency. Our data indicate that companies on CRM or EM’s lists have 
superior returns and that companies on CRM or EM’s lists are more likely to have multiple 
female directors on their boards. Consequently, our data suggest an interactive effect between 
corporate reputation and the number of female directors. 
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TABLE 5: AVERAGE PERCENT CHANGE IN SHARE PRICE AND EM’S LISTINGS 
      
Panel A: Average Percent Change for all Corporations (average = 7.7 percent) 
  Number of Female Directors  
  None One Multiple Total 
   Ethical corporations (%) 10.7 15.9 16.4 16.2 
 (n)    (1) (10)  (32)  (43) 
 χ2 stat NA 8.80 9.90 18.70 
      
   Remaining corporations (%) 10.9 6.2 6.2 6.8 
 (n) (52) (125) (229) (406) 
 χ2 stat 1.35 0.29 0.29 1.93 
      
Panel B: Average Percent Change for Corporations with Positive Returns (average = 19.9 percent) 
  Number of Female Directors  
  None One Multiple Total 
   Ethical corporations (%) 10.7 21.5 20.5 20.4 
 (n)    (1)   (8) (28) (37) 
 χ2 stat NA 0.13 0.02 0.15 
      
   Remaining corporations (%) 23.7 19.8 19.0 19.9 
 (n)  (43) (100) (174) (317) 
 χ2 stat 0.72 0.00 0.04 0.75 
      
Panel C: Average Percent Change for Corporations with Negative Returns (average = -38.0 percent) 
  Number of Female Directors  
  None One Multiple Total 
   Ethical corporations (%)    na   -6.6 -11.9 -10.1 
 (n)     (0)    (2)    (4)    (6) 
 χ2 stat NA 25.92 17.90 43.82 
      
   Remaining corporations (%) -50.4 -48.1 -34.4 -39.8 
 (n)     (9)   (25)   (55)   (89) 
 χ2 stat 4.07 2.70 0.34 7.11  
18




 When considering the effect that women on the board have on the financial returns, it was 
interesting to find that stock prices varied by the direction of the return. While the corporations 
on either CRM’s or EM’s list had significantly greater increases in their stock prices compared to 
corporations not on these lists, this was not the case when we divided the sample into groups 
with gains versus losses. When analyzing the gains separately, our results indicated that being on 
CRM’s list had the opposite of what we anticipated. The corporations not listed by CRM had a 
slightly higher (3.3 percent) gain; however, the difference was not significant. There was not a 
difference with respect to the corporations on (not on) EM’s list. The data did not support our 
research hypothesis dealing with corporate reputation and stock prices for corporations with 
positive returns. 
When analyzing the losses separately, our results indicated that being on CRM’s or EM’s 
list was significantly associated with a reduction in price declines The corporations listed by 
CRM had a significantly lower loss in value than the corporations not on this list (-9.1 and -45.2 
percent respectively). The corporations listed by EM also had a significantly lower loss in value 
than the corporations not on this list (-10.1 and -39.9 percent respectively). Consequently, there 
appears to be an economic benefit to being on either of these lists.  
When we tested our data for the proportion for female directors, we used the same 
groupings as we did to test for changes in stock prices (i.e., overall change and increasing-and-
decreasing stock prices. The corporations listed by CRM consistently had a lower number of 
corporations with no female directors or only one female director and a higher than expected 
number of corporations with multiple female directors. The opposite was true for corporations 
that were not listed by CRM; a higher number of these corporations had no female directors or 
only one female director and a lower than expected number with multiple female directors. The 
corporations listed by EM had a lower number of corporations with no female directors or only 
one female director and a higher than expected number of corporations with multiple female 
directors. The opposite was true for corporations that were not listed by EM; these corporations 
consistently had a higher number with no female directors or only one female director and a 
lower than expected number of corporations with multiple female directors.  
The combined findings indicate that corporations on either CRM’s or EM’s list have a 
higher than expected number of boards that include multiple female directors. Additionally, the 
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corporations on these lists are more likely to have higher overall changes in stock prices and 
lower decreases in their stock prices. The stock performance figures imply that higher numbers 
of women on boards may be able to alter the internal elements of an organization, thus 
decreasing the likelihood of a loss in value to shareholders.  
There are four inherent limitations to our study. First, we included only corporations listed 
in the 2010 Fortune 500. Our second limitation is that we used only CRM’s ‘100 Best Corporate 
Citizens List’ and EM’s 2010 ‘World’s Most Ethical Companies’ lists. Third, we examined only 
the effect of having female directors on boards of directors. Fourth, we used only changes in 
common stock prices. These limitations provide opportunities for future research in this area that 
include examining: a more diverse corporate sample; using other measures of corporate social 
responsibility; including minorities as board members; and, using other measures of financial 
performance.  
Future research could take the form of a longitudinal study that determines whether the 
organizations with a lower female boardroom presence experienced larger stock losses for a 
longer time period. Future studies might also consider using return on assets and return on equity 
as internal corporate performance measures to test whether the number of women on a board has 
an impact on these figures. Finally, future research could also survey investors to determine 
whether the number of women on the board associates with their valuation of the organization.  
Author information: The authors are staff members at the Gabelli School of Business, Roger 
Williams University, Bristol, RI 02809, United States of America. The corresponding author is 
Richar A. Bernardi, Professor of Accounting and Ethics: he may be contacted at E-mail: 
rbernardi@rwu.edu or Phone: 1-(401)-254-3672. 
  






Panel A: Corporate Responsibility Magazine’s Criteria for Identifying “100 Best 
Corporate Citizens” 
“100 Best Corporate Citizens” methodology uses publicly available information to determine 
the world’s top corporate responsibility ranking. CR Magazine contracts with a third party 
research organization to collect data and develop initial rankings. Once all the necessary 
information was collected, the companies were scored relative to their industry peers 324 data 










The companies included in the analysis were defined as the 2010 Russell 1000. The rankings 
are determined from the ordinal list of companies that results from applying the Corporate 
Citizenship Criteria detailed above.  
Data Category # Data Elements 2010 Weighting Percent 
Environment 133 19.5% 
Climate Change 60 16.5% 
Human Rights 40 16.0% 
Employee Relations 65 19.5% 
Philanthropy 9 9.0% 
Financial 8 12.5% 
Governance 9 7.0% 
Panel B: Explanation of Corporate Responsibility Magazine’s Process 
CR Magazine’s researchers and editors employed a detailed process. The separate and 
sequential analyses conducted were:  
 STEP 1 Selection of and Contracting with a Research Firm 
 STEP 2 Determination of Evaluation Criteria 
 STEP 3 Data Collection 
 STEP 4 Data Sources 
 STEP 5 Undisclosed Data 
 STEP 6 Data Validation 
 STEP 7 Review and Publication 
Where: 
Steps 1-2 determined that way that analysis would be completed and includes getting input and 
opinions from NGOs, academics, investment analysts, etc.  
Step 3-6 focus on data collection using only publicly available information (company 
websites, 10-Ks, government datasets, etc.). Undisclosed information negatively influences the 
company’s ranking. Data validation is done by the research team reviewing their work and by 
providing the opportunity for companies to correct factual inaccuracies.  
Step 7 allows companies two opportunities to review the datasets determined by the research 
team (not their rankings), after this period, the information and rankings are provided to CR. 
From Corporate Responsibility Magazine (2011)* 
*The 2011 methodology details were used as 2010 details were unavailable 






Ethisphere’s Criteria for Identifying “The World’s Most Ethical Companies” 
World’s Most Ethical Companies™ (WME) methodology analyzes companies that go beyond 
making statements about doing business ‘ethically’, to translate those words into action. WME 
winners demonstrate real and sustained ethical leadership within their industries, putting the 
Council’s credo of “Good, Smart, Business, Profit” into real business practice. The Ethics 
Quotient (EQ) framework is consists of a series of multiple-choice questions in five core 
categories. These are used to capture and rate a company’s performance in an objective, 
consistent, and standard manner. The categories and associated weighting are: 
 1. Ethics and Compliance Program 
2. Reputation, Leadership and Innovation 
3. Governance 





The EQ score is derived given the relationship to answers provided and formulas based on 
demographic qualifiers. The top percentile of performers in each of the 35 industries are then 
independently researched and analyzed to verify ethics performance. 
From Ethisphere (2010)  
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